Abstract
Preface
Over the past 12 years I have been involved in the space business. First as an orbital analyst at Cheyenne Mountain tracking space objects. From there I went to Schriever Air Force Base (AFB) where I was a Defense System Communications Satellite controller. My last space operations job was at Vandenberg AFB where I was a Delta II launch controller and the chief of spacelift evaluations. During these assignments I gained a tremendous appreciation of the intricacies of orbits, satellites and the gargantuan effort to put a satellite in the correct orbit.
I realized that the Air Force has been in the spacelift business now for 50 years and today we're doing spacelift essentially the same way. This would be no problem if the context we're living in were the same, but the 21 st century expects more from us than the century gone by. We need to provide routine, reliable and affordable access to space. Our military depends on it and our nation demands it.
Introduction

Short of warfare, space launch is the fastest way of destroying a $1 billion oeplus investment ever invented, as the USAF managed to demonstrate three times in nine months between August 1998 and April of last year.
-Jane's International Defense Review March 2000
Statement of the Research Question
As startling as this quote may be, it begs the question, what can the United States do to improve space launch? This paper examines the issues and problems with space launch. The purpose is to determine what the United States can do to make space launch more affordable, reliable, and responsive. Providing robust space launch, that meets these standards, will support the United States' military and economy.
The study accomplishes three tasks. Initially, it describes how United States space launch isn't affordable, reliable, or responsive. Then it delves into the future of space launch, highlighting Sea Launch, an international commercial venture, and discusses what the United
States could learn from this consortium. Finally, it provides recommendations aimed at improving the United States' future in space launch.
Background and Significance of the Problem
Past. Since its inception in the 1950s, spacelift has long been considered the Achilles' heel of space operations. Spacelift hasn't been reliable, cost effective, or flexible. The rule of thumb in spacelift was, if it wasn't broken don't change it. After all, each launch was a testament to an amazing engineering feat. However, times did change and spacelift had to enter into the 21 st century with new concepts.
Changing Times. Throughout the 1990s commercial satellite launches were on the rise oe quickly outpacing the dozens per year of military satellite launches. This in turn begged the question oe what does space launch mean to the US as a country? For example, does the US want to be an international industry leader in getting to space? Is the US' international prestige and commerce on the line if the US doesn't have the most robust space launch system in the world?
More specifically, is access to space so important to the US that it would be considered a vital national interest? Furthermore, military requirements have changed.
The military changed from using space assets as a -gee whiz" capability to an essential part of planning and employing forces. This in turn meant that space assets were expected to be responsive, reliable, and ready on demand. If the satellites were expected to respond to such tasks, certainly the transportation to get satellites into space oe spacelift oe must be just as
responsive. So what could the US do to improve space launch?
Future. The Sea Launch program, an international civilian consortium, is an innovative example from which the United States can inspect launch problems and bring about creative ideas in solving these problems. Starting in 1995, the Sea Launch program tried to rectify the exorbitant costs of launching, the bottle neck in the launch schedules at Vandenberg AFB and Cape Canaveral AFB, the outdated range equipment, the legacy rockets' limited capacity, and lastly the dilapidated launch infrastructure. All of these areas need monetary investment and new ideas to improve the prospect of the Sea Launch consortium to make money on their venture. Similarly, the US can learn from this consortium, as these were the problems they were trying to solve. This study addresses some of Sea Launch's novel approaches.
Limitations of the Study
This study doesn't cover the full range of influences on the United States space launch program. Other papers and studies have previously done this. This paper is limited to a cursory glance of cost, reliability, and responsiveness of military space launch. In addition, it does not provide a comprehensive list of recommendations for launch improvements. Rather this paper uses one commercial example, Sea Launch, and hones in on three broad reaching lessons learned oe limiting costs, improving reliability, and reducing response time.
Preview of the Argument
The United States civilian and military sectors have long understood space launch as a challenging task. Space launch was a task in which cost and responsiveness were not the primary focus. Furthermore, in the United States space launch was reliable until the past 3 years.
Times changed. Assuming the United States wants to stay competitive in commercial and military space ventures, the United States must quickly work to improve space transportation. The following sections will address space launch's most pressing issues oe the high cost, and the lack of reliability and responsiveness. In particular, each section provides information on why it's important to the United States and updates the reader on the current status of costs, reliability, and responsiveness. The first section starts with the largest hurdle facing the United
What the US Needs
States launch program, the expense.
Cost
It's necessary to consider space launch expenditures due to their inherent astronomical costs.
Furthermore, limited budgets curb future development. To adequately address this issue, one needs to study how the high costs came about. In particular a discussion of the military legacy programs (Delta, Atlas, and Titan) helps frame the topic. Finally, the last part of this section will look at cost-cutting future concepts.
The largest single obstacle to the progress of space exploration and using space for human benefit, is the cost of space transportation. 4 -The cost of access to space has remained so high that only two customers can afford it: the federal government, and the geosynchronous telecommunications satellite industry." 5 As a result the space launch industry has stagnated with proven but costly old systems and procedures.
One of the reasons the fleet of expendable boosters was so expensive was that the Delta, Atlas, and Titan evolved from 1950s/1960s intercontinental missiles. These legacy boosters focused on military, not commercial attributes. To perform their military mission of long-range nuclear delivery, the boosters were built to maximize performance. They were ready at a moment's notice, required minimum weight to accommodate their deployment schemes, and provided one-way trips with no reusable parts. When these boosters were pressed into space launch service, they provided maximum performance and minimum weight, but they were not optimized for cost. 6 Similarly the manned space flight program's top priority was not cost savings. 
Reliability
Space launch reliability is important to the United States because it's directly related to launch costs and it has a national security and economic impact. This section will discuss the reliable history of space launch, the costly failures in the past 3 years, and the monetary impacts of losing launch vehicles and payloads. Furthermore, it will address the issue of international prestige in space for both the military and the economy. Finally, the last part will look at what the United States is doing to improve space launch reliability.
The United States has had a reliable history of space launch. Since 1958 the United States has successfully launched 777 Delta, Atlas, and Titan missions. 14 These missions deployed DoD satellite constellations, space probes, and carried the Mercury and Gemini astronauts to orbit.
They were also the foundation for the United States commercial launch industry. Their reliability averaged between 94-95 percent. 15 However, in the past 3 years things changed considerably.
Between August 1998 and April 1999 there were three Titan IV-related failures and two Delta III commercial failures. The Air Force Accident Investigation and Safety boards discovered one of the Titan IV missions failed because of an electrical short in the core vehicle and the other two failed due to problems (one was a human error oe loading the wrong code) with the upper stage. The Titan IV launch failures were carrying very expensive payloads. The three payloads impacted were a reconnaissance satellite valued at $1.4 billion, a Defense Support
Program Satellite valued at $600 million, and a MILSTAR satellite valued at $1.1 billion.
The Delta III failures were blamed on design and engineering flaws.
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The Delta III vehicles were also carrying expensive payloads oe Galaxy and Orion communications satellites. The failure of the three government missions combined with the failure of two commercial missions within the same time frame, sparked widespread concern in our ability to assure access to space. Because assured access to space is critical to the overall strength and stability of our national security, commercial, and civil sectors, both the Executive and Legislative branches asked the Department of Defense, in coordination with the director of Central Intelligence and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to examine the failures and provide a report on the causes and corrective actions being taken to prevent their reoccurrence and to ensure future access to space.
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The military needs a reliable access to space to be a viable threat to our enemy. The vision for the Air Force is to have space superiority oe assuring US forces freedom from attack and freedom to attack. 19 In the medium of space it will be difficult to have superiority if the United
States doesn't have reliable access. In addition to the military necessity, the United States economy is dependent on reliable space access.
The space launch business is a growing international marketplace. Since the United States wants to be part of the $6.5-7 billion a year global launch market, 20 the United States needs to improve its launch reliability. Increased commercialization of the launch industry threatens to put unreliable boosters out of business. Today the United States space industry is finding competition from launch providers in Europe, Russia, Ukraine, China, Japan, India, Israel, and
Brazil. 21 Many of these countries are new to the launch business and haven't seen success, however in the case of the Russians, their launch reliability is on par, and in some cases better, than the United States' launch reliability. 22 The United States currently holds one-third of the world's launch market and is making strides to improve their market share by improving reliability.
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The United States is looking at two areas to improve space launch reliability. The first is to fix the current problems with the launch vehicles, specifically the Titan IV and the Delta III.
Then, they will take those lessons learned and integrate them into the EELV, comprised of the Delta IV and the Atlas V launch vehicles.
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The Space Launch Broad Area Review, a group chartered by the Air Force to conduct an examination of the launch failures and to make recommendations, determined the problems with the Titan IV and Delta III launches were design, engineering, quality, process, staffing, and skill retention. The report suggests the underlying problem was the contractors who were -focused heavily" on closing out the old systems to acquire and organize for the new EELV. 25 The DoD has implemented corrective actions and is taking aggressive action to improve launch practices and procedures for future missions. 26 The -aggressive action" appears to have worked because there have been four successful Titan IV launches and one successful Delta III launch since the August 1998 failure. 27 28 These lessons have been turned over to the EELV program.
In addition to lowering the cost for launching and improving reliability, a top priority for the military is assured access to space. This entails getting a payload up in space quickly in response to a perceived threat to US interests.
Responsiveness
Launch responsiveness is key to the United States primarily for its national security applications. First, this section addresses the doctrinal reasons the military needs responsive, or on-demand, access to space. Then, it will discuss the long road ahead to responsive space launch.
According to Air Force Doctrine Document Why is a company launching from the sea? The Sea Launch consortium is launching from open ocean locations to get flexibility in launch azimuth and independence from government owned launch facilities. In addition, the international privately funded consortium, which includes Boeing (40%) and companies from Ukraine (15%), Norway (20%), and Russia (25%), predicts to capitalize on a growing commercial launch market.
1 Furthermore, to keep launch costs down and reliability at an optimum they built an entire launch infrastructure and working launch system using reliable components in combination with a new automated launch processing system. 
Cost
Sea Launch advertises that it is cost beneficial because their marine operations reduce launch infrastructure, the equatorial site allows for heavier payloads, and their location and independent range scheduling help avoid expensive launch delays. Launching on the sea has two major pluses that prevent expensive launch delays for the satellite customer -range scheduling is independent of the government and the weather on the open seas is typically better than the weather on the continental coasts. First, the satellite customer doesn't have to compete with higher priority government launches that could bump the launch position of the commercial user. Also, due to its location, Sea Launch doesn't need to get on the busy schedule at the continental ranges at Vandenberg AFB, California and Cape
Canaveral AFS, Florida. The second focus is the weather. The weather on the coasts is often foggy and inclement (too hot or too cold) causing costly launch delays. As of the first six launch attempts, the weather hasn't prevented a single launch at the equatorial Sea Launch site. 8 These are Sea Launch's concepts for cost cutting. Has Sea Launch delivered a cost-beneficial product?
Sea Launch status remains true to their word on the cost benefits. They have reduced launch infrastructure while still providing a myriad of customer options. Also, the equatorial site has launched the heaviest commercial payload in history. 9 Finally, to date there have been no range scheduling delays due to range conflicts or poor environmental conditions. All of these areas will benefit Sea Launch and in turn provide their customers with a cost-effective method of launching their satellites into space. Another aspect that closely correlates to the cost of launching a satellite is the reliability of the space transportation.
Reliability
There are two areas Sea Launch touts as key to their reliability oe proven high performance components and efficient operations. Using proven, reliable components from the world's premier companies is the hallmark of Sea Launch. The Sea Launch vehicle's first and second stage are the robust heavy-lift (11,000 lbs to high orbit) 10 , to be the sixth launch, the launch was halted only 11 seconds before launching due to -worries" about a satellite reading.
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As it tuned out, there was nothing wrong with the XM-1/Roll satellite but proceeding so far down in the countdown would cause long delays for the Zenit rocket. Since the Zenit engine had already initiated its pre-start sequence, Sea Launch decided they needed to refurbish the Zenit engine before they make another launch attempt. Sea Launch has shaved off launch costs and learned lessons on reliability, but where do they stand on responsiveness? The key is to make the ranges more efficient while still protecting the surrounding population.
Responsiveness
Reliability
The United States is dependent on reliable space launch for national security and economic reasons. Until the past 3 years, the United States was a nation to emulate in the space launch will be averted by using the highest performance parts or the most automated systems.
To continue a history of reliable space launch for both national security and the economy, the United States can't get lax on procedures and proven methods. Furthermore, the United
States must realize that with every new space launch vehicle comes inherent risk. They must be willing to accept calculated risk, learn from the lessons, and continue to evolve. Areas the United States should invest in are preparing contingency operations and better modeling and simulation for space hardware.
Responsiveness
At this point in time, the military sector of space launch is primarily concerned with launch responsiveness. The military is focused on a future of space power and space superiority. To realize this, the military must have assured access to space, which means on-demand launch capability. On demand currently is not available since the processing time for a launch is measured in months. However, USSPACECOM projects to compress the processing timeline to days by the year 2020. However, there is a gap between new systems coming on line (EELV) and what our doctrine's vision is for the future of space launch. Although the definition for responsiveness in the military is different than responding to customers of a business, there are some similar concepts.
Sea Launch has come up with creative ideas to respond to their customer needs but there is still room for improvement. For their launch customer they were very flexible on slipping the launch date if the satellite wasn't ready in the expected time. Furthermore, if the satellite was ready as planned, they launched according to their proposed schedule. On the contrary, during the last launch attempt, Sea Launch had to travel 2-weeks back to home port simply to refurbish the main engine. Adding another 2-weeks on for a return trip to the Equator meant a 1-month turnaround time simply for the transportation. This was not very responsive. Another factor to consider is that Sea Launch has a minimal launch schedule oe only planning 6 launches per year of which they have only attempted 3 launches per year.
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The United States needs to make launch scheduling more flexible and reactive. To do this, the US needs to limit the time the booster is on the launch pad. For example, horizontal processing then erect the booster on the pad oe similar to the Russian Proton or vertical processing in a vehicle assembly building and move it out to the pad just about ready to go oe similar to the Shuttle and Titan IV and the proposed Delta IV. The US also has to construct more launch pads.
Building more launch pads will allow a margin to handle launch -surges," accommodate launch slips, support anomaly resolution, and accept pad downtime for modernization.
Implications of the Study
The implications of space launch for the United States are far reaching. The United States depends on space launch for national security and the economy. The primary factors are cost, reliability, and responsiveness. There is an inherent risk involved when trying to reduce costs and increase reliability at the same time. In addition, the more responsive you expect a system to be, the more requirements you will incur. This will also bring up the price tag. This shouldn't
